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Abstract
An overlapping generations version of an R&D-based growth model ‘a la Diamond
(1965) and Jones (1995) is built to examine how improvement in quality of schooling
impact technical progress and long- run economic growth of an economy by influ-
encing fertility and education decisions at household level. The results indicate that
improvement in schooling quality triggers a child quantity-quality trade-off at house-
hold level when quality of schooling exceeds an endogenously determined threshold.
At the household level, parents invest more in education of children and have lesser
number of children in response to improvement in quality of schooling. This micro-level
tradeoff has two opposing effects on aggregate human capital accumulation at macro
level. Higher investment in education of a child stimulates the accumulation of human
capital which fosters technical progress but the simultaneous decline in fertility rate
reduces the total factor productivity growth and economic growth by contracting the
pool of available researchers. The first effect prevails over latter only when quality of
schooling is higher than the threshold.
Keywords— fertility, quality of schooling, economic growth, demographic transition
1 Introduction
As per the estimates of Barro and Lee (2013), the share of population without any formal schooling
in developing countries has declined from 54.6 percent in 1960 to approximately 17.4 percent in
2010. However, merely expanding access to education does not ensure that children actually learn
in schools. The learning outcomes in schools closely hinge upon the quality of schooling, which has
been given inadequate attention in the development policy paradigms of most developing countries
until now. But recently, development policy paradigms of most countries are gradually shifting
towards improving learning quality in schools than merely expanding access to education. This
policy paradigm shift in education policy is also reflected in the post-2015 development agenda.
Imparting quality education features as the fourth Sustainable Development Goal set by the United
Nations. This shift is motivated by two factors.
First, there is growing evidence that quality of schooling matters more for economic growth.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) provide an extensive discussion
of how scores from cognitive skill tests can be used to measure the quality of human capital and its
effects on economic growth. They use data from six voluntary international tests of mathematics
and science to build a measure of quality of education. They find that the estimate of human capital
quality has a significant positive impact on growth. Several studies have since found very similar
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results (Bosworth & Collins, 2003; Ciccone & Papaioannou, 2009; Islam, Ang, & Madsen, 2014).
Second, poor quality of schooling remains a dismal reality in developing countries. UNESCO (2014)
reports that 250 million children are functionally illiterate and innumerate despite 50 percent of
them having spent at least four years in school. According to the Annual Status of Education
Report (ASER) (2017) survey titled “Beyond Basics”, based on an assessment of 30,000 children
in 28 districts of 24 states in India, only 43 percent of 14-18 year olds could do simple division after
eight years of schooling. Less than half of the children surveyed could not add weights in kilograms
and more than 40 percent could not tell hours and minutes from a clock. This scenario is staggering
and reveals a gloomy picture about the learning outcomes of children in Indian schools. Similarly,
Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2010) report that teachers from rural schools in Kenya were absent 20
percent of the time; while, in Zambia and Pakistan, teachers were absent, respectively, 18 percent
and 10 percent of the time (J. Das, Dercon, Habyarimana, & Krishnan, 2004; Reimers, 1993). This
implies that poor quality of schooling significantly distorts the learning outcomes in schools, which
in turn, has far-reaching implications on growth prospects of developing countries.
In this paper, we build an overlapping generations version of an R&D-based growth model
a´ la Diamond (1965) and Jones (1995) to analyze how improvement in quality of schooling and
the associated changes in fertility and education decisions at the micro level influence the long-run
economic growth of an economy. Our work is closely related to two broad strands of literature. First,
there is theoretical literature that analyzes the linkages between quality of schooling and economic
growth. Many existing studies (M. Das & Guha, 2012; Gilpin & Kaganovich, 2012; Tamura, 2001)
on quality of schooling and economic growth focus on explaining how determinants of quality of
schooling such as teacher-student ratio and teacher quality together impact the learning process,
and the consequent human capital formation and, therefore, economic growth. However, most
of these studies assume exogenously determined population growth and do not consider technical
progress in their models. Consequently, these studies are unable to analyze the impact of schooling
quality and the resulting demographic change on R&D activities, which are a major determinant
of technological development in the present world. We improve upon these papers by endogenizing
both - population growth and technical change. Specifically, our work focuses on interactions
between quality of schooling and demographic change, which influence total factor productivity
growth and, therefore, growth prospects of an economy.
Second, our research relates to the literature linking R&D based growth with endogenous fer-
tility and education decisions (Hashimoto & Tabata, 2016; Strulik, 2005; Strulik, Prettner, &
Prskawetz, 2013). In particular, this work is closely related to Strulik et al. (2013). Strulik et
al. (2013) analyze child quantity-quality trade-off by integrating R&D based innovations into a
unified growth framework. They explain why high levels of total factor productivity and economic
growth in modern economies are associated with low or negative population growth by consider-
ing a child quantity-quality trade-off at the household level. In their theoretical model, decisions
related to fertility and education are endogenously determined by households. A substitution of
child quantity, n, by child quality (i.e. expenditure on education), e, that keeps total child ex-
penditure, e.n, constant sets free parental time, which can be used to earn extra income. The
additional income is partly spent on education, such that the overall child expenditure rises more
proportionately than child quantity falls. On the macro side of the economy, this trade-off means
that the magnitude by which human capital per person, h rises is larger than the magnitude by
which number of persons, L, falls. The net impact of this micro level trade-off is that the total
available human capital h.L increases at the macro level. Given that human capital is the driving
force for R&D, this entails a higher R&D output and higher R&D-based growth.
Although our modelling framework is similar to Strulik et al. (2013), we go beyond Strulik et
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al. (2013) in atleast three respects. First, the focus of our research is not on formulating a unified
growth theory which explains the entire transition of an economy from Malthusian stagnation to
modern growth. Instead, the purpose of this work is to build a growth model that explains the
inter-linkages between quality of schooling, demographic change and technological improvements
in a modern economy. Therefore, this paper focusses on characterizing two types of economies
with low and high quality of schooling and examines the corresponding drivers of economic growth
in these two types of economies. To the best of our knowledge, this issue is yet to be explicitly
discussed in the literature. Second, our study examines the impact of a demographic transition
triggered by improvement in quality of schooling. Strulik et al. (2013) focus on impact of a de-
mographic transition induced by technological progress. Third, we extend Strulik et al. (2013) by
considering two distinct channels of technological improvement - innovation and imitation. Under
the innovation regime, technological improvements occur by innovating on local technology fron-
tier whereas under imitation regime, technological progress occurs by imitating existing foreign
technologies. In this respect as well, this work is an improvement over existing research in this
area.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic structure of the model. Section
3 contains the key analytical results for a decentralized economy, which provide the key propositions
of this study. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model and Equilibrium Solutions
2.1 The Economic Environment
We consider a model economy populated by overlapping generations of people who live for two
periods: adulthood and old age. Time is discrete and goes from 0 to ∞. During childhood, which
is not modeled explicitly, individuals are reared and educated by their parents. All the decisions
are made at the beginning of adulthood. Adults are identical in all aspects. They inelastically
supply their skills in the labor market. Adults care about consumption of a homogeneous final
good, number and human capital level of their children. During old age, individuals consume their
savings plus interest earned on these. Abstracting from gender differences, each household has a
single parent. For avoiding the indivisiblity problem, we assume that children are in continuous
number. All individuals survive up to adulthood. The education of current period’s children
determines human capital endowment of next period’s adult generation. Akin to Castello´-Climent
and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2012), human capital accumulation function depends on an exogenously
given quality of education system, parental investment in education and human capital of parent.
Parental investment in education is a fraction of income spent on education of each child.
The production structure of the economy closely follows Romer (1990) and Jones (1995). The
economy consists of three sectors: final goods sector, intermediate goods sector and R&D sector.
2.2 Individuals
Individuals derive utility from c1,t, their own consumption (of the final good) during adulthood;
c2,t+1, their own consumption during old age; nt, number of children and ht+1, human capital
of children. Parents’ motivation to invest in human capital of children by spending on children’s
education is driven by a “warm glow” of giving (Andreoni, 1989) or preference for having “higher-
quality” children (Becker, 1960). The lifetime expected utility of individuals in generation t is given
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by:
ut = log c1,t + β1 log c2,t+1 + β2 log(ht+1nt), (1)
where positive weights β1 and β2 measure the importance of future consumption and child quantity
and quality relative to current consumption in the utility function. Alternatively, following De la
Croix and Doepke (2004), β2 can be interpreted as an altruism factor.
An adult’s human capital is denoted by ht and the wage per unit of human capital is wt. Young
adults spend their income on current consumption, savings for old-age consumption and child’s
education expenditure. Rearing a child necessarily takes fraction τ ∈ (0,1) of an adult’s time,
which is given exogenously. Accordingly, the budget constraints for the young and old adults are
given by:
wtht(1− τnt) = c1,t + st + et(wtht)nt; (2)
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st, (3)
where et is the fraction of income per child spent on education, st is savings and rt+1 is interest
rate. Non-negativity constraints apply to all the variables.
The human capital of children, ht+1, depends on human capital of parents, ht, parental invest-
ment in education per child, et, and quality of education system, θ, which is exogenously given.
ht+1 = (µ+ θet)
ht,  < 1. (4)
The parameters satisfy µ ≥ 1 and  ∈ (0,1).  measures the returns to education. µ is the
intergenerational human capital spillovers that are basically skills learnt by children by observing
and imitating parents. The parametric restriction of µ ≥ 1 ensures that the growth rate of per
capita human capital does not become negative when parents do not invest in education. It ensures
that children will acquire knowledge and skills atleast equivalent to their parents when parents do
not educate their children.The assumption that quality of schooling is an argument in human capital
accumulation function is consistent with a number of studies. Hanushek, Lavy, and Hitomi (2008)
find that lower-quality schools lead to higher dropout rates in case of Egyptian primary schools.
Similarly, Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) find that cognitive skills, a proxy for educational
quality, is positively related to individual earnings. In theoretical terms, Castello´-Climent and
Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2012) have shown in their theory of human capital investment that high-quality
education increases the returns to schooling and incentivizes human capital accumulation via two
channels- extensive and intensive margins. Higher quality makes education accessible to more
people (extensive margin), and once individuals decide to participate in higher education, higher
quality increases the investment made per individual (intensive margin). Parental human capital,
ht, as an input in human capital accumulation technology represents intergenerational transfers
of human capital, which is a common assumption in the literature (De la Croix & Doepke, 2004;
Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002, 2003; Tamura, 2001).
Individuals maximize utility in eq. (1) with respect to the constraints, eqs. (2) to (4) using
control variables c1,t, st, nt and et. The solution to individuals’ decision problem can either be
interior, or at a corner where the individuals choose zero education. The first-order conditions
yield the following solution, as in eqs. (5) to (8), for consumption and savings irrespective of
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whether education is in the interior or at the corner:1
c1,t =
wtht
1 + β1 + β2
; (5)
st =
β1wtht
1 + β1 + β2
. (6)
For child quantity and quality, there exists a threshold level of quality of schooling. If quality
of schooling falls below the threshold, adults do not spent on child quality and maximize child
quantity. This constitutes the corner solution. In particular, following results are derived from the
first-order conditions:
et =
0, if θ ≤
µ
τ ;
τθ− µ
θ(1− ) , otherwise,
(7)
nt =

β2θ
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
, if θ ≤ µτ ;
β2θ(1− )
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ) , otherwise.
(8)
Inserting eq. (7) in eq. (4), we get an equation of motion for human capital as:
ht+1 =

µht, if θ ≤ µτ ;[
(τθ − µ)
(1− )
]
ht, otherwise.
(9)
Below the threshold, quality of schooling is not an argument in human capital production function.
Without education expenditure, human capital of next generation consists of basic skills only. From
eqs. (5) to (8), irrespective of whether quality of schooling exceeds threshold or not, savings and
consumption are increasing in wtht and there is no direct effect of income on fertility because a
positive income effect of an increase in wages on fertility is balanced by a negative substitution
effect. The quality of schooling has a direct bearing on child quantity and quality. The following
lemma shows how quality of schooling influences fertility behavior.
Lemma 1 When quality of schooling is high enough to surpass the threshold, a marginal improve-
ment in the quality of schooling triggers a child quantity-quality trade-off such that adults bear lesser
number of children and invest more in education per child in response to improvement in quality
of schooling. However, when quality of schooling is lower than the threshold, then it has no effect
on child quality as adults do not invest in child’s education and focus instead on maximizing child
quantity.
Proof.By investigating the corner solution in eqs. (7) and (8), it can be immediately seen that
quality of schooling entails no child quantity-quality trade-off if quality of schooling falls below the
threshold. Adults do not spend on education and maximize fertility. To see the effect when quality
of schooling is above the threshold, we take the derivatives of the interior solution of et and nt with
respect to θ in eqs. (7) and (8). That is,
∂nt
∂θ
=
−µβ2(1− )
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ)2 < 0;
1Detailed mathematical derivations are provided in Appendix A.
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∂et
∂θ
=
µ
(1− )θ2 > 0.
When quality of schooling is less than the threshold, the derivatives of the corner solution of et and
nt with respect to θ in eqs. (7) and (8) yield:
∂nt
∂θ
=
β2
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
> 0;
∂et
∂θ
= 0.
Thus, it can be seen that fertility changes are directly triggered by quality of schooling. Any
improvement in quality of schooling over and above the threshold makes learning in schools more
effective and, therefore, increases marginal returns to investment in human capital. Consequently,
a parent reduces fertility and spends more on education per child. Thus, quality of schooling can
be perceived as another plausible mechanism for triggering child quantity-quality trade-off besides
other commonly proposed mechanisms such as declining child mortality (Soares, 2005), rise in life
expectancy of parents (Boucekkine, Croix, & Licandro, 2003; Boucekkine, De la Croix, & Licandro,
2002; Hashimoto & Tabata, 2016; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002, 2003), technical progress (Galor & Weil,
2000) and decline in gender wage gap (Galor & Weil, 1996). These theoretical results are in line
with recent empirical findings. For example, Hanushek et al. (2008) find that lower quality of
schooling leads to higher dropout rates in Egyptian primary schools. A cross-country analysis by
Castello´-Climent and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2012) reveals that quality of education has a positive
effect on enrollment rates in secondary schooling only when quality of schooling is sufficiently high.
Lemma 2 An increase in returns to education, , leads to a child quantity-quality trade-off wherein
parents educate their children and bear lesser number of children when quality of schooling surpasses
the threshold. However, when quality of schooling is less than the threshold, returns to education
has no effect on education of children and parents maximize child fertility.
Proof.Taking the derivatives of the interior solution of et and nt with respect to  in eqs. (7) and
(8), one gets that:
∂nt
∂
=
−β2θ
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ) < 0;
∂et
∂
=
τθ − µ
θ(1− )2 > 0.
When quality of schooling is less than the threshold, the derivatives of the corner solution of et and
nt with respect to  in eqs. (7) and (8) yield:
∂nt
∂
=
β2θ
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
> 0;
∂et
∂
= 0.
This implies that returns to education is yet another factor that can trigger a child quantity-
quality trade-off. High returns to education implies education makes human capital more produc-
tive. Therefore, parents invest in education of their children and decide to have lesser number of
children. However, when quality of schooling is less than the threshold, then parents decide not to
make any investment in the education of children and, therefore, returns to schooling has no effect
on child quality and child quantity is maximized. Both Lemmas 1 and 2 will be used later in our
analysis.
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2.3 Final Goods Sector
The final homogeneous good, Yt is produced and sold in a competitive market. Firms produce
the final good, Yt using human capital, H
Y
t , and a range of intermediate inputs. The production
function for firms is defined as:
Yt = (H
Y
t )
1−α
At∑
i=1
xαit, 0 < α < 1. (10)
The parameter, α, is the capital share in final good production. The price of final good, PY ,
has been normalized to 1. In each period t, the final good producers solve the following profit
maximization problem with respect to their choice of range of intermediate inputs and human
capital,HY :
Maxxit,HYt pit(Y ) = (H
Y
t )
1−α
At∑
i=1
xαit − wYHYt −
At∑
i=1
pitxit,
where pit is the unit monopoly price of ith intermediate input and wY is the wage rate prevailing
in final good sector. The first-order conditions imply that:
pit = α(H
Y
t )
1−αxα−1it ; (11)
wY =
(1− α)(HYt )1−α
∑At
i=1 x
α
it
HYt
=
(1− α)Yt
HYt
. (12)
Eq. (11) yields the demand for each intermediate input as:
xit =
[
α
pit
] 1
1−α
HYt . (13)
An analysis of the intermediate goods sector ensues.
2.4 Intermediate Goods Sector
Each intermediate good i is produced by monopolist producer who holds the blueprint to produce xit
quantity at time t. Each intermediate good uses only capital in a one-to-one production technology,
or xit = Kit. Thus, the amount of intermediate inputs produced of all types equals the aggregate
capital stock of the economy.
At∑
i=1
xit = Kt. (14)
Each ith intermediate good producer maximizes profits with respect to his/her choice of capital.
That is,
Maxxit pit(i) = pitxit − rtKit = α(HYt )1−αxαit − rtxit,
where the expression in r.h.s derives from substituting solution to pit from eq. (11) and xit = Kit.
rt is price per unit of capital. The first-order condition yields:
rt = α
2(HYt )
1−αxα−1it . (15)
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Using eq. (11), we get the solution to the equilibrium price as pit = pt =
rt
α
. This is the monopoly
price charged as a markup over marginal cost. Note that being independent of i, this price is
constant across all intermediate goods. From eq. (13), this implies that quantity produced of
each ith intermediate input is the same, that is, xit = xt =
[
α2
rt
] 1
1−α
HYt . This entails that, in
equilibrium, the profit of the ith monopolist is given by:
pit = ptxt − rtxt ≡
[rt
α
− rt
]
xt ≡
[
1− α
α
]
rtxt;
= α(1− α)H1−αY xαt , (16)
where the last expression is derived using eq. (15) and xit = xt in equilibrium. Since, in equilibrium,
intermediate inputs are sold at the same price and demanded in equal quantities, aggregate physical
capital is given by Kt = Atxt. Inserting this information into the production function of final good,
eq. (10) simplifies to:
Yt = (H
Y
t )
1−αA1−αt K
α
t . (17)
Accordingly, equilibrium profits of ith monopolist in eq. (16) simplifies to:
pit = α(1− α) Yt
At
. (18)
Also, since in equilibrium, xit = xt and Kt = Atxt, the price per unit of capital in eq. (15) can be
expressed as:
rt = α
2(HYt )
1−α
[
At
Kt
]1−α
, (19)
Further using eq. (17), rental rate of capital simplifies to:
rt = α
2
[
Yt
Kt
]
. (20)
Next, the R&D sector is discussed.
2.5 R&D Sector
Under the assumption of free entry into the R&D sector, firms employ human capital, HAt , to
develop new blueprints which are sold at price, pAt . This price is common to all the blueprints due
to the competitive feature of the R&D sector. We consider two types of regimes that can drive
R&D activities. The R&D sector produces blueprint of an intermediate variety either by imitating
from the world technology frontier or by innovating upon the local technology level. Following
Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian (2006) and Guillo´, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2011),
the production function of technology for a firm is postulated as:
At+1 −At = δtHAt , (21)
where At+1 − At are new blueprints and HAt is the human capital working in R&D sector. Pro-
ductivity of R&D activity, δt, is constant at the firm level but at the aggregate level, it is defined
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as:
Innovation regime : δt = δ¯(H
A
t )
λ−1Aφt ; (22)
Imitation regime : δt = δ¯(H
A
t )
λ−1Aφt
[
A¯t
At
]
. (23)
R&D productivity depends positively on the number of already existing ideas, At, and human
capital employed in R&D sector, HAt . The parameter δ¯ denotes general productivity in R&D.
0 < φ < 1 measures intertemporal knowledge spillovers (standing-on-shoulders effect) and 0 < λ < 1
measures returns to R&D effort (stepping-on-toes effect). A¯t is world technology frontier that
grows exogenously at rate, gA¯. The standing-on-shoulders effect may arise as existing knowledge
contributes to the capacity to innovate. The returns to human capital differ between the firm
level and the economy-wide level. There exists constant returns to R&D effort at the firm level
as revealed by eq. (21). However, the R&D technology shows diminishing returns to R&D effort
as researchers generate negative externality at the aggregate level (stepping-on-toes effect). The
stepping-on-toes effect may arise due to competition among multiple R&D firms to become the first
to succeed at creating and patenting a new blueprint and/or process. If all other factors are held
constant, an increase in R&D effort will induce increased duplication of research efforts leading to
stepping-on-toes effect. Additionally, R&D productivity depends on a catch-up term,
A¯t
At
under
imitation regime. Akin to Nelson and Phelps (1966),
A¯t
At
is the catch-up term which signifies the
fact that greater the technological gap between leader and follower economy, higher the potential
of the follower economy to catch up through imitation of existing technologies. Since all R&D firms
end up in a symmetric equilibrium, the production function of technology under imitation regime
at the aggregate level reduces to:
At+1 −At = δ¯(HAt )λAφt
[
A¯t
At
]
. (24)
The catch-up effect is specific to imitation regime only. Under the innovation regime, firms innovate
upon the local technology level to discover new blueprints. In this case, the aggregate production
function reduces to:
At+1 −At = δ¯(HAt )λAφt . (25)
Each firm in the R&D sector maximizes profits, given by:
pit,A = p
A
t (At+1 −At)− wAHAt ,
where pAt is price of a blueprint, At+1 −At are number of new blueprints discovered and wA is the
wage rate. Under both imitation and innovation regimes, using eq. (21), profit function of R&D
firm can be expressed as:
pit,A = p
A
t δt(H
A
t )− wAHAt . (26)
In both the technology regimes, maximization of profits leads to following optimality condition:
wA = p
A
t δt. (27)
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Substituting for δt from eq. (22), the wage rate under innovation regime is now given by:
winA = p
A
t δ¯(H
A
t )
λ−1Aφt =
[
pAt δ¯(H
A
t )
λAφt
HAt
]
, (28)
Similarly, wage rate under imitation regime is expressed as:
wimA =
pAt δ¯(H
A
t )
λAφt
A¯t
At
HAt
. (29)
Using eqs. (24) and (25), the wage rate under both the technology regimes simplifies to:
wA =
[
pAt (At+1 −At)
HAt
]
. (30)
where wages of scientists are increasing in price of blueprint (price of patent) and number of
blueprints discovered.
The decision to produce an intermediate variety by an intermediate input producer depends
on the difference between the cost of acquiring the patent for a blueprint from the R&D sector,
pAt , and the monopoly profits, pit, that can be earned by producing intermediate varieties. Given
this information, the R&D sector will set the price of patent, pAt such that it extracts the present
discounted value of monopoly profits of intermediate firms. The research arbitrage condition yields
the following price of blueprint:2
pAt =
pit
rt − gH . (31)
Substituting for pit from eq. (18) and inserting this in eq. (30), the wage rate under both the
technology regimes is derived as:
wA =
α(1− α)YtgA,t
(rt − gH)HAt
, (32)
where gA,t =
At+1 −At
At
.
Now in equilibrium, demand for human capital in R&D sector and final good sector should add
up to:
HAt +H
Y
t = Ht.
Assuming ω proportion of total labor force is allocated to R&D sector and (1−ω) proportion goes
to final good sector, we get that:
HAt = ωHt & H
Y
t = (1− ω)Ht. (33)
In equilibrium, wages in final good and R&D sectors should equalize, that is, wY = wA. Substituting
for wY and wA from eqs. (12) and (32), we get that:
HAt
HYt
=
αgA,t
rt − gH (34)
2Detailed derivation is provided in Appendix B.
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We deduce the proportion of human capital that is employed in R&D sector in equilibrium after
substituting for HAt and H
Y
t in eq. (33) as:
ω =
αgA,t
(rt − gH) + αgA,t . (35)
Accordingly, the equilibrium wage rate in the two sectors is given by:
wA = wY =
(1− α)Yt
HYt
. (36)
We next characterize the BGP of our decentralized economy for both innovation and imitation
regimes for two cases - a) when an economy’s quality of schooling is sufficiently high, θ >
µ
τ
and
b) when quality of schooling is less than the threshold, θ ≤ µ
τ
.
3 Dynamics and Steady-State Properties of the Styl-
ized Economy
3.1 Dynamics of the Key Variables
This section examines the dynamic properties of our stylized economy. First, we discuss the dy-
namics of physical factors of production. The aggregate population, Nt, grows at the fertility rate,
nt as follows:
Nt+1 = ntNt, (37)
where nt is endogenously given by eq. (8). Taking child rearing time into account, the size of the
workforce is given by Lt =(1− τnt)Nt. Since child rearing costs are constant, and from eq. (8) we
know that fertility rate is also constant over time, the workforce grows at the fertility rate, as:
Lt+1 = ntLt. (38)
Assuming that physical capital depreciates fully within a generation (that is, depreciation is 100
percent) so that next period’s capital stock consists of this period’s aggregate savings, the market
clearing condition for capital market will be
Kt+1 = stNt, (39)
where Nt is the population of generation t. Inserting the solutions for savings from eq. (6) and
wage rate from eq. (36) and using the fact that Nt = Lt from eqs. (37) and (38), we get :
Kt+1 =
β1(1− α)YtHt
(1 + β1 + β2)HYt
,
Finally inserting for Yt from eq. (17) we get the equation governing the evolution of aggregate
physical capital as:
Kt+1 = BtK
α
t A
1−α
t Ht(H
Y
t )
−α, (40)
where Bt =
[
β1
1+β1+β2
]
(1− α).
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Next, we discuss the dynamics of aggregate human capital, Ht ≡ htLt. The dynamics of per
capita human capital are given by eq. (9). Using eqs. (9) and (38), the equation for aggregate
human capital accumulation can be written as:
Ht+1
Ht
=

µnt, if θ ≤ µτ ;[
(τθ − µ)
(1− )
]
nt, otherwise.
(41)
Furthermore, the proportion of workforce employed in R&D sector, ω, (given by eq. (35)) is
constant as gH is constant as shown in eq. (41) and rt is constant along BGP as shown later in
Proposition 3.2. Therefore, along BGP, we have:
HYt+1
HYt
=
HAt+1
HAt
=
Ht+1
Ht
. (42)
This follows from eq. (33).
From eqs. (24) and (25), the dynamics of total factor productivity can be expressed as:
Imitation regime:
At+1 = At + δ¯H
λ
t A
φ
t
[
A¯t
At
]
, (43)
Innovation regime:
At+1 = At + δ¯H
λ
t A
φ
t . (44)
This system of equations fully describes the equilibrium dynamics of our model economy for all the
plausible cases.The next subsection characterizes the balanced growth paths of an economy for two
cases - a) when an economy’s quality of education system is sufficiently high, θ >
µ
τ
, and b) when
quality of schooling is less than the threshold, θ ≤ µ
τ
.
3.2 Characterizing the Balanced Growth Path
A balanced growth path (BGP) is a long run equilibrium of the economy, also defined as the steady
state, along which growth rate of variables is either zero or constant over time. For any variable x,
the growth rate is denoted by gx,t = (xt+1−xt)/xt, and its rate of change by g˜x,t = (gx,t+1−gx,t)/gx,t.
The balanced growth, thus, requires g˜x,t = 0. We denote the growth rate of x along the BGP
by gx, i.e., by omitting the time index for brevity. We begin by evaluating the physical capital
accumulation along the BGP. From eq. (40), we deduce that:
1 + gK,t ≡ Kt+1
Kt
=
[
Kt
Kt−1
]α [ At
At−1
]1−α Ht
Ht−1
[
HYt
HYt−1
]−α
;
Using the result that at steady state,
Kt+1
Kt
=
Kt
Kt−1
and
HYt+1
HYt
=
Ht+1
Ht
from eq. (42), the above
expression further simplifies to[
Kt+1
Kt
]1−α
=
[
At+1
At
]1−α [Ht+1
Ht
]1−α
.
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Thus, we obtain:
gK = (1 + gA)(1 + gH)− 1. (45)
The growth of physical capital and productivity are positively correlated along the steady state.
Next, we consider the growth rate of total factor productivity. Under innovation regime, we observe
from eq. (43) that:
1 + gA,t ≡ At+1
At
= 1 +
δ¯
1
1−φ (HAt )
λ
1−φ
At
;
Since along BGP, l.h.s is constant, therefore, r.h.s must also be constant and this holds true when
(1 + gA) = [(1 + gh)n]
λ
1−φ . (46)
The r.h.s follows from the definition of aggregate human capital Ht = htLt and from eq. (42).
Further, we observe from eq. (44) that the rate of technical progress under the imitation regime
can be written as:
1 + gA,t ≡ At+1
At
= 1 +
δ¯
1
2−φ (HAt )
λ
2−φ A¯t
1
2−φ
At
.
Similarly, using the definition of BGP, we derive the long-run rate of technological progress under
imitation regime as:
(1 + gA) = (1 + gH)
λ
2−φ (1 + gA¯)
1
2−φ = [(1 + gh)n]
λ
2−φ (1 + gA¯)
1
2−φ . (47)
Thus, under both imitation and innovation regimes, technological progress is driven by growth in
aggregate human capital. Human capital accumulation improves productivity of researchers, which
fosters technological progress. Besides aggregate human capital, the growth of world technology
frontier is an additional driver of growth under the imitation regime. The follower economy takes
advantage of existing technologies through technology adoption. Therefore, as the world technology
frontier grows, it enhances the potential of follower country to catch up through imitation.
Next, we ascertain the growth rates of aggregate GDP and per capita consumption along BGP.
From eq. (17) we observe that:
1 + gY,t ≡ Yt+1
Yt
=
[
Kt+1
Kt
]α [At+1
At
]1−α [HYt+1
HYt
]1−α
.
Using eqs. (45) and (42), the long run growth rate of GDP is expressed as:
gY = (1 + gA)(1 + gH)− 1. (48)
From eqs. (45), (46), (47) and (48), we derive the BGP of the stylized economy under the two
technology regimes as:
Innovation regime:
gK = gY = [(1 + gh)n]
1−φ+λ
1−φ − 1; (49)
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Imitation regime:
gK = gY = [(1 + gh)n]
2−φ+λ
2−φ (1 + gA¯)
1
2−φ − 1, (50)
where
[(1 + gh)n] = (1 + gH) =

β2θ
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
1−  , if θ ≤ µτ ;
β2θ
(1− )1−
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ)1− , otherwise.
This follows after substituting the value of n from eq. (8) in eq. (41).
Furthermore, we observe from the consumer’s optimization exercise that:
ct+1
ct
= β1(1 + rt+1). (51)
The r.h.s follows from substituting values of ct and st from eqs. (5) and (6) in eq. (3). Using eqs.
(20), (49) and (50), we deduce that:
ct+1
ct
= β1
[
1 + α2
Yt
Kt
]
. (52)
Along BGP, since gK = gY , per capita consumption grows at a constant rate under both the
technology regimes.
Furthermore, we derive the conditions when the economic growth rate is higher for an economy
with high quality of schooling, θ >
µ
τ
as compared to an economy with lower quality of schooling,
θ ≤ µ
τ
under the two technology regimes. We assume that when θ >
µ
τ
, quality of schooling
is denoted by θh for that particular economy whereas quality of schooling is denoted by θl for an
economy with quality of schooling less than the threshold, θ ≤ µ
τ
. As shown in eqs. (49) and
(50), the rate of economic growth is contingent upon the rate of human capital accumulation under
the two technology regimes. This means that under the two technology regimes, an economy with
higher quality of schooling, θh, grows at a higher rate as compared to an economy with a lower
quality of schooling, θl when the following condition holds true:
gH|(θh> µτ ) > gH|(θl≤ µτ )
Substituting for gH|(θh> µτ ) and gH|(θl≤ µτ ) from eqs. (49) and (50), we have:
β2θh
(1− )1−
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθh − µ)1− >
β2θl
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
1−  ,
which on simplification yields the following condition:
θh > θl
[
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]1−
. (53)
We know that,
θ >
µ
τ
.
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Multiplying both sides by τ and then, subtracting µ from both sides yields
(τθ − µ)
1−  > µ,
Since µ ≥ 1, we have:
(τθ − µ)
1−  > 1. (54)
Thus,
[
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]1−
> 1. Thus, we have,
Proposition 3.1 • Under innovation regime, aggregate output, physical capital stock, total
factor productivity and per capita consumption grow at a constant rate along the balanced
growth path characterized by eqs. (49), (46) and (52).
• Under imitation regime, aggregate output, physical capital stock, total factor productivity and
per capita consumption grow at a constant rate along the balanced growth path characterized
by eqs. (50), (47) and (52).
• Under the two technology regimes, an economy with higher quality of schooling, θh > µ
τ
, expe-
riences a higher economic growth as compared to an economy with lower quality of schooling,
θl ≤ µ
τ
if the quality of schooling, θh is sufficiently high such that:
θh > θl
[
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]1−
. (55)
Intuitively, under both the technology regimes, the self-sustaining growth path is driven by human
capital accumulation when quality of schooling exceeds the threshold, θ >
µ
τ . At the micro level,
parents decide to have fewer number of children and invest more in their education. This follows
from Lemma 1. At the macro level, this trade-off raises the rate of human capital accumulation,
which encourages faster technological progress and, therefore, economic growth. Besides human
capital, growth of world technology frontier is an additional driver of growth under the imitation
regime via the catch-up effect.
Alternatively, when quality of schooling is less than the threshold, θ ≤ µτ , parents do not
invest in education of children and instead maximize fertility. In this case, the balanced growth
path of the economy is driven only by population growth, which in turn, is determined by the
fertility rate. Thus, the drivers of economic growth differ depending upon the level of quality of
schooling. When quality of schooling surpasses the threshold level, economic growth is driven by
human capital accumulation whereas it is driven by population growth when quality of schooling
is less than the threshold.
Furthermore, a mere surpassing of the threshold level of quality schooling is not sufficient
enough for an economy to experience a higher economic growth rate as compared to an economy
with quality of schooling lower than the threshold level. Under the two technology regimes, quality
of schooling should be high enough such that it leads to high enough investments in education of
children such that the growth-stimulating effect overpowers the growth-impeding effect of quality
of schooling by a larger magnitude. This, in turn, can only ensure that an economy with a higher
quality of schooling ( that is, θh >
µ
τ
) experiences a higher economic growth as compared to an
economy with a lower quality of schooling (that is, θl ≤ µ
τ
).
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Otherwise, an economy with lower quality of schooling may experience a higher economic growth
rate than an economy with higher quality of schooling for large enough values of child rearing costs, τ
or for small enough value of intergenerational human capital spillovers, µ and returns to education, 
respectively. This follows directly from eq. (55). It can be observed that the expression,
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
is increasing in τ . In this particular case when the value of τ is sufficiently high, population growth
rate can be a more effective driver of economic growth as the threshold value of quality of schooling
for higher economic growth is so high that an economy may consider not investing an education of
the future generation as a relatively more beneficial outcome . Similarly, it can be shown that:
∂
∂µ
(τθh − µ)
µ
=
−τθh
µ2
< 0;
∂
∂

1−  =
−1
(1− )2 < 0.
This implies that the threshold value of quality of schooling for higher economic growth is decreasing
in the value of µ and  respectively. Thus, this threshold value of quality of schooling can be high
enough for sufficiently small µ and  such that population growth rate can be a more effective driver
of economic growth and an economy may not invest in human capital of its future generation.
Next, we analyze the evolution of wage rate and rate of interest along the steady state. From
eq. (20), under both the technology regimes, rate of interest is given by:
rt = α
2 Yt
Kt
.
A closer examination of the above expression for rate of interest reveals that it is constant along
BGP, if Yt and Kt grow at the same rate. From eqs. (49) and (50), we know that along the BGP:
gK = gY .
This implies that rate of interest is constant along the BGP. Also, it is known from eq. (36) that
wage rate is expressed as:
wA = wY =
(1− α)Yt
HYt
.
It can be observed from eq. (49) that under innovation regime:
(1 + gY ) = [(1 + gh)n]
1−φ+λ
1−φ ;
Also, from eq. (50) under imitation regime, we have:
(1 + gY ) = [(1 + gh)n]
2−φ+λ
2−φ (1 + gA¯)
1
2−φ .
Eqs. (36), (42), (49) and (50) together imply that, along BGP, wage rate under innovation regime
grows at the rate:
gw = [(1 + gh)n]
λ
1−φ ; (56)
And along BGP, wage rate under imitation regime grows at the rate:
gw = [(1 + gh)n]
λ
2−φ (1 + gA¯)
1
2−φ , (57)
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where
[(1 + gh)n] = (1 + gH) =

β2θ
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
1−  , if θ ≤ µτ ;
β2θ
(1− )1−
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ)1− , otherwise .
This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 When θ >
µ
τ
or θ ≤ µ
τ
:
• Under both the innovation and imitation regimes, rate of interest is constant along the bal-
anced growth path.
• Under both the innovation and imitation regimes, the wage rate grows at the rate of technical
progress given by eqs. (56) and (57) along the balanced growth path.
Under both the technology regimes, the rate of interest is constant along the BGP. However, wage
rate rises over time along BGP under both imitation and innovation regimes irrespective of quality
of schooling being higher or lesser than the threshold. Growth rate of technology of the leader
economy is an additional source of growth of wage rate under imitation regime.
Additionally, eqs. (49) and (50) suggest that technological progress and aggregate output
are positively correlated with population growth. This implies that decline in population growth
entails a decline in rate of technical progress as postulated by conventional R&D based growth
models (Jones, 1995; Romer, 1990). This type of macro-level superficial examination misses the
point that aggregate human capital accumulation and fertility rate are inversely related via quality-
quantity trade-off at the family/household level as shown in Lemma 1 and 2. The investment in
education increases and fertility rate falls simultaneously as the quality of schooling increases above
the threshold. This quality-quantity trade-off implies that the effect of population growth on total
factor productivity growth and GDP growth cannot be analyzed in isolation keeping human capital
growth constant. This leads to the question: how does improvement in quality of schooling and
returns to education affect total factor productivity growth and, therefore, economic growth by
influencing fertility and education decisions?
This can be answered by carrying out comparative dynamics with respect to these parameters
that has been done in the next subsection.
3.3 Comparative Dynamics Analyses of the Balanced Growth Path
3.3.1 Comparative Dynamics w.r.t Quality of Schooling, θ
Since total factor productivity growth and economic growth depend on the rate of human capital
accumulation under both the regimes of technological improvement, we first carry out comparative
dynamics of the growth rate of aggregate human capital with respect to schooling quality. We take
the derivative of the growth rate of aggregate human capital with respect to schooling quality, θ,
when it exceeds the threshold, that is, θ >
µ
τ
. Detailed derivations of eqs. (58) and (59) are
provided in Appendix C.
∂gH
∂θ
=
[
(1 + gh)β2(τθ − µ)(1− )
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ)2
]
> 0, (58)
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in view of  < 1. Thus, in the aggregate, the growth rate of technology increases in response to an
increase in schooling quality which sustains economic growth in the long-run.
We next analyze the derivative of the growth rate of aggregate human capital with respect to
schooling quality when it is less than the threshold, that is, θ ≤ µ
τ
. We get that,
∂gH
∂θ
=
[
β2
(1 + β1 + β2)µ1−
]
> 0. (59)
Thus, it can be deduced that,
Proposition 3.3 The long-run rate of technical progress, gA, and economic growth, gY , increase in
response to an improvement in the quality of schooling on account of different channels, depending
upon the quality of schooling, θ:
• When θ > µ
τ
, gA and gY are increasing in θ due to higher rate of human capital accumulation
under both the regimes of technological improvement.
• When θ ≤ µ
τ
, gA and gY are increasing in θ due to higher population growth rate under both
the regimes of technological improvement .
The intuitive explanation for the impact of a change in quality of schooling on the long-run rate
of technical progress and economic growth is as follows. When quality of schooling surpasses the
threshold, it has two opposing effects on human capital accumulation. We know from Lemma 1
that an improvement in quality of schooling increases investment in the education of a child. This
stimulates the accumulation of human capital which fosters technical progress leading to higher
economic growth in the economy. This effect can be regarded as the growth-stimulating effect. The
increase in education is also accompanied by a decline in fertility rate as the quality of education
improves. This constitutes the growth-impeding effect that reduces the total factor productivity
growth and economic growth by contracting the pool of available researchers. Total factor pro-
ductivity growth and economic growth will accelerate or decelerate depending upon the relative
magnitude of the two effects. As shown by eq. (58), the growth-stimulating effect overpowers the
growth-impeding effect of a change in quality of schooling when quality of schooling exceeds the
threshold, that is, θ >
µ
τ
.
When quality of schooling is less than the threshold, parents do not educate their children and
instead focus on having more children. In this particular case, there exist no growth-stimulating
and growth-impeding effects of quality of schooling. In this case, the rate of technical progress and
economic growth increase in response to an increase in the quality of schooling solely due to higher
population growth, as parents focus on maximizing fertility when quality of schooling is less than
the threshold.
Thus contingent upon the quality of schooling, there are two different channels at work which
foster technical progress and economic growth. This result is similar to Hashimoto and Tabata
(2016) finding about old-age survival probability and economic growth. They find that in economies
in which old-age survival probability is sufficiently low, an increase in old-age survival probability
motivates individuals to invest more in their own education, accelerating the accumulation of per
capita human capital and, thereby, enhancing the long-run growth rate of the economy. However,
in economies where old-age survival probability is sufficiently high, an increase in old age survival
probability will lead to decline in population growth rates, thereby lowering the long-run growth
rate of the economy.
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We next consider the comparative dynamics of growth rate of per capita output, gy = Yt/Lt
with respect to θ. At steady state, growth rate of per capita output under innovation regime is
given by:
gy = (1 + gh)
1−φ+λ
1−φ n
λ
1−φ − 1. (60)
And under imitation regime, it is given by:
gy = (1 + gA¯)
1
2−φ (1 + gh)
2−φ+λ
2−φ n
λ
2−φ − 1. (61)
We first consider the case when, θ >
µ
τ
. Differentiating gy with respect to θ under innovation
regime yields:3
∂gy
∂θ
=
1 + gy
1− φ
[
(1− φ+ λ)τ
τθ − µ −
µλ
θ(τθ − µ)
]
(62)
It can be observed that
∂gy
∂θ
> 0, if
(1− φ+ λ)τ
(τθ − µ) >
µλ
θ(τθ − µ) ,
which simplifies to
θ >
µλ
τ(1− φ+ λ) .
This holds true as θ >
µ
τ
, λ < 1 and φ < 1. Thus,
∂gy
∂θ
> 0. (63)
Similarly, under imitation regime, differentiating per capita income growth rate with respect to θ
yields:
∂gy
∂θ
=
1 + gy
2− φ
[
(2− φ+ λ)τ
τθ − µ −
µλ
θ(τθ − µ)
]
. (64)
Now,
∂gy
∂θ
> 0 if
(2− φ+ λ)τ
τθ − µ >
µλ
θ(τθ − µ) ,
which, upon simplification, yields:
θ >
µλ
τ(2− φ+ λ) .
3Detailed derivations of eqs. (62) and (64) are provided in Appendix D.
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This holds true as θ >
µ
τ
, λ < 1 and φ < 1. Therefore,
∂gy
∂θ
> 0. (65)
When θ ≤ µ
τ
, differentiating per capita income growth rate with respect to θ yields:4
Innovation regime:
∂gy
∂θ
=
(1 + gy)λ
θ(1− φ) > 0; (66)
Imitation regime:
∂gy
∂θ
=
(1 + gy)λ
θ(2− φ) > 0, (67)
as φ < 1.
Next, we determine when the growth rate of per capita income will be higher for an economy
with higher quality of schooling, θ >
µ
τ
, as compared to an economy with lower quality of schooling,
θ ≤ µ
τ
, under the two technology regimes. We assume that when θ >
µ
τ
, quality of schooling
is denoted by θh for that particular economy, whereas quality of schooling is denoted by θl for
an economy with quality of schooling less than the threshold, θ ≤ µ
τ
. Derivations provided in
Appendix E show that an economy with higher quality of schooling, θh, will experience a higher
per capita income growth rate as compared to an economy with a lower quality of schooling, θl, if
the following conditions hold under the individual technology regimes. Innovation regime:
θh > θl
[
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]λ−(1−φ+λ)
λ
; (68)
Imitation regime:
θh > θl
[
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]λ−(2−φ+λ)
λ
. (69)
Suppose, we postulate that,
λ− (1− φ+ λ)
λ
> 1, and
λ− (2− φ+ λ)
λ
> 1.
which can be simplified to yield the following expressions:
−(1− φ+ λ)
λ
> 0, and
−(2− φ+ λ)
λ
> 0.
4Detailed derivations of eqs. (66) and (67) are again provided in Appendix D.
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This is a contradiction as φ < 1, λ < 1 and  < 1. Therefore,
λ− (1− φ+ λ)
λ
< 1, and
λ− (2− φ+ λ)
λ
< 1. (70)
Further, it is known from eq. (54) that
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− ) > 1. Therefore, eqs. (70) and (54) together
imply that [
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]λ−(1−φ+λ)
λ
> 1, and[
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]λ−(2−φ+λ)
λ
> 1. (71)
Thus, from eqs. (63), (65) (66) and (67), it can be deduced that,
Proposition 3.4 • For θ > µ
τ
and θ ≤ µ
τ
, gy is unambiguously increasing in θ along the
balanced growth path under both the innovation and imitation regimes of technological im-
provement.
• An economy with higher quality of schooling, θh > µ
τ
, will experience a higher per capita
income growth rate as compared to an economy with lower quality of schooling, θl ≤ µ
τ
if the
quality of schooling, θh, is sufficiently high captured by the following:
Innovation regime:θh > θl
[
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]λ−(1−φ+λ)
λ
> θl;
Imitation regime:θh > θl
[
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]λ−(2−φ+λ)
λ
> θl.
The growth rate of per capita income along the BGP can be expressed as (1 + gy) =
(1 + gY )
n
.
It is known from Proposition 3.3 that the economic growth rate, gY , is increasing in θ as growth-
stimulating effect dominates the growth-impeding effect of quality of schooling when it exceeds the
threshold. Also, it is known from Lemma 1 that parents bear a lower number of children in response
to an improvement in quality of schooling. Thus, the fertility rate or the population growth rate
is decreasing in θ. Consequently, the growth rate of per capita income rises as quality of schooling
improves under both the technology regimes.
Further, it has been shown in Lemma 1 that parents maximize fertility and do not spend on
education of their children when θ ≤ µ
τ
. It follows from Proposition 3.3 that the rate of technical
progress and economic growth increase in response to an increase in the quality of schooling solely
due to higher population growth. This higher population growth rate raises economic growth rate
via two channels. First, higher aggregate human capital accumulation fosters technical progress
and, therefore, economic growth. Secondly, higher aggregate human capital accumulation leads to
higher economic growth directly as human capital enters as an input in the production function
of the final good, Yt. It can be observed from eqs. (60) and (61) that quality of schooling raises
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population growth rate by a lesser proportion as compared to the proportionate rise in growth rate
of aggregate output under both the regimes of technical improvement. As a result, growth rate of
per capita income is increasing in quality of schooling under both the technology regimes.
Also, a mere surpassing of the threshold level of quality schooling is not sufficient enough for
an economy to experience a higher growth rate of per capita output as compared to an economy
with quality of schooling lower than the threshold level. The intuitive explanation for this result
is similar to the explanation given for the condition stated in Proposition 3.1. Under the two
technology regimes, quality of schooling should be sufficiently high such that it leads to high enough
investments in education of children, entailing that the growth-stimulating effect overpowers the
growth-impeding effect of quality of schooling by a larger magnitude. Conversely, an economy with
low quality of schooling may experience a higher per capita output growth rate than an economy
with high quality of schooling for large enough values of child rearing costs, τ , or for small enough
value of inter-generational human capital spillovers, µ and returns to education,  respectively.
This follows directly from eq. (55). Next, the comparative dynamics with respect to returns to
education, , are discussed.
3.3.2 Comparative Dynamics w.r.t Returns to Education, 
We first analyze the derivative of the growth rate of aggregate human capital with respect to returns
to education. We get that,5
∂gH
∂
= (1 + gH)log
[
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
> 0 (72)
as
(τθ − µ)
1−  > 1 from eq. (54). Similarly, when θ ≤
µ
τ
, the derivative of the growth rate of
aggregate human capital with respect to returns to education yields:
∂gH
∂
= (1 + gH)
[
1

+ logµ
]
> 0. (73)
Thus, we have,
Proposition 3.5 The long-run rate of technical progress, gA, and aggregate output, gY , increase
in response to an increase in returns to education, , on account of different channels, depending
upon the quality of schooling, θ:
• When θ > µ
τ
, gA and gY are increasing in  due to higher rate of human capital accumulation
under both the regimes of technological improvement.
• When θ ≤ µ
τ
, gA and gY are increasing in  due to higher inter-generational human capital
spillovers and higher population growth rate.
The intuitive explanation for the impact of a change in returns to education on the long-run rate
of technical progress and economic growth is as follows. We know from Lemma 2 that an increase
in returns to education triggers a child quantity-quality trade-off at the micro level. The threshold
value of quality of schooling,
µ
τ
, is decreasing in the value of . This implies that, ceteris paribus,
this critical threshold value decreases as returns to schooling increase when quality of schooling
5Detailed derivations of eqs. (72) and (73) are provided in Appendix F.
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exceeds the threshold. Therefore, parents educate their children and bear lower number of children
in response to an increase in returns to education. Similar to the impact of quality of schooling,
this micro level trade-off generates a growth-stimulating effect and a growth-impeding effect at the
macro level. The growth-stimulating effect overpowers the growth-impeding effect of a change in
returns to education when quality of schooling exceeds the threshold. Resultantly, an increase in
returns to education yields higher rate of technical progress and, therefore, higher economic growth
under both innovation and imitation regimes of technological improvement.
Alternatively, when quality of schooling is less than the threshold, parents do not educate their
children and, instead, focus on having more children. Therefore, similar to the effect of quality
of schooling, the rate of technical progress increases in response to an increase in the returns to
education due to higher population growth. Additionally, it can be observed from eq. (9) that
inter-generational human capital spillovers become more productive and spur growth rate of per
capita human capital as returns to education increase. On the whole, when θ ≤ µ
τ
, an increase
in returns to education yield higher rate of technical progress and, therefore, economic growth
under both innovation and imitation regimes due to higher growth rate of population and higher
inter-generational human capital spillovers.
Lastly, we examine the impact of a change in returns to education, , on the growth rate of per
capita income along the BGP under the two technology regimes. When θ >
µ
τ
, differentiating per
capita income growth rate with respect to  under the innovation and imitation regimes, yields:6
Innovation Regime:
∂gy
∂
=
(1− φ+ λ)(1 + gy)
1− φ
[
1
1−  + log
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
− (1 + gy)λ
(1− )(1− φ) . (74)
Now, it can be observed that
∂gy
∂
> 0, if
(1− φ+ λ)
[
1
1−  + log
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
>
λ
1−  ,
which simplifies to
1 +
(1− φ)
λ
+
(1− )(1− φ+ λ)
λ
log
(τθ − µ)
1−  > 1. (75)
The above expression can be re-expressed as:
(1− φ)
λ
+
(1− )(1− φ+ λ)
λ
log
(τθ − µ)
1−  > 0. (76)
Similarly, under imitation regime, we have,
∂gy
∂
=
(2− φ+ λ)(1 + gy)
2− φ
[
1
1−  + log
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
− (1 + gy)λ
(1− )(2− φ) . (77)
Now,
∂gy
∂
> 0, if
(2− φ+ λ)
[
1
1−  + log
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
>
λ
1−  , (78)
6Detailed derivations of eqs. (74) and (77) are provided in Appendix G.
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which simplifies to
(2− φ)
λ
+
(1− )(2− φ+ λ)
λ
log
(τθ − µ)
1−  > 0. (79)
We know that θ >
µ
τ
,  < 1, λ < 1 and φ < 1. Also,
(τθ − µ)
1−  > 1 from eq. (54).
Therefore, the expressions in eqs. (76) and (79) hold true. We next, consider the case when
θ ≤ µ
τ
. Differentiating per capita income growth rate with respect to  yields the following.7
Innovation regime:
∂gy
∂
= (1 + gy)
[
1 +
λ
1− φ
]
logµ+
λ(1 + gy)
(1− φ) > 0, and (80)
Imitation regime:
∂gy
∂
= (1 + gy)
[
1 +
λ
2− φ
]
logµ+
λ(1 + gy)
(2− φ) > 0 (81)
since φ < 1 and µ ≥ 1. An examination of these derivatives yields the following results.
Proposition 3.6 When θ >
µ
τ
and θ ≤ µ
τ
, gy is unambiguously increasing in  along the
balanced growth path under both the regimes of technological improvement.
Intuitively, we know that per capita income is given by yt = Yt/Lt. The growth rate of per capita
income along the BGP can be expressed as (1 + gy) =
(1 + gY )
n
. It is known from Proposition 3.5
that the economic growth rate, gY , is increasing in . Also, it is known from Lemma 2 that parents
bear lower number of children in response to a rise in returns to education. Thus, the population
growth rate is decreasing in returns to education, . Consequently, the growth rate of per capita
income rises as returns to education increase under both the technology regimes.
Furthermore, it follows from Proposition 3.5 that an increase in returns to education yields
higher rate of technical progress and, therefore, economic growth under both innovation and imita-
tion regimes due to higher growth rate of population and higher inter-generational human capital
spillovers when θ ≤ µ
τ
. Similar to the effect of quality of schooling, it can be observed from eqs.
(60) and (61) that returns to education raise population growth rate by a lesser proportion as
compared to the proportionate rise in growth rate of aggregate output under both the technology
regimes. Therefore, growth rate of per capita income rises as returns to education rises.
This completes the characterization of the balanced growth path of our decentralized economy.
4 Discussion
This paper formulates an analytical framework to analyze the impact of quality of schooling on
economic growth of an economy under imitation and innovation regimes.We characterize two types
of economies. The first type is an innovation economy where technological improvements occur
by innovating upon the local technology frontier. The second type is an imitation economy where
technological progress occurs by imitating existing foreign technologies. We find that the quality
7Detailed derivations of eqs. (80) and (81) are again provided in Appendix G.
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of schooling triggers a child quantity-quality trade-off at the micro level when quality of schooling
surpasses an endogenously determined threshold under both the technology regimes. When quality
of schooling surpasses the threshold, parents invest in the education of their children and bear
lesser number of children. However, parents focus on maximizing fertility and do not educate their
children when quality of schooling is less than the threshold. This micro-level trade-off generates
two types of effects on economic growth at the macro level - a growth-stimulating effect and a
growth-impeding effect. Our results show that the former effect dominates over latter only when
the quality of schooling is higher than the threshold, and the economy is on a self-sustaining
growth path. Alternatively, when the quality of schooling is less than the threshold, parents do
not educate their children and focus, instead on maximizing fertility. Higher fertility rate leads to
higher population growth, which propels economic growth rate under both innovation and imitation
regimes.
Furthermore, a mere surpassing of the threshold level of quality schooling is not sufficient enough
for an economy to experience a higher growth rate of per capita output as compared to an economy
with quality of schooling lower than the threshold level. Under the two technology regimes, quality
of schooling should be high enough such that it leads to high enough investments in education
of children, entailing that the growth-stimulating effect overpowers the growth-impeding effect of
quality of schooling by a larger magnitude. This, in turn, can only ensure that an economy with
quality of schooling above the threshold exhibits a higher per capita income growth as compared
to an economy with quality of schooling less than the threshold.
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A Solution to Household’s Optimization Exercise
The utility function is described as follows:
Maximize
ut = log c1,t + β1 log c2,t+1 + β2 log(ht+1nt)
subject to
wtht(1− τnt) = c1,t + st + et(wtht)nt
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st
ht+1 = (µ+ θet)
ht,  < 1
After substituting for c2,t+1 and ht+1, the langragean for this problem is formulated as :
L = log c1,t + β1 log[(1 + rt+1)st] + β2 log nt + β2 log(µ+ θet) + β2 log ht
+ψ[wtht(1− τnt)− c1,t − st − etnt(wtht)]
The choice variables are c1,t, st,et and nt.The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂c1,t
= 0⇔ 1
c1,t
− ψ = 0⇔ c1,t = 1
ψ
. (A.1)
∂L
∂st
= 0⇔ β1
st
− ψ = 0⇔ st = β1
ψ
. (A.2)
∂L
∂nt
= 0⇔ β2
nt
− ψτwtht − ψetwtht = 0⇔ β2
nt
= ψ[τ + et]wtht ⇔ nt = β2
ψ[τ + et]wtht
. (A.3)
∂L
∂et
= 0⇔ β2θ
µ+ θet
− ψntwtht = 0⇔ nt = β2θ
ψ[µ+ θet]wtht
. (A.4)
From eqs. (A.3) and (A.4), the l.h.s can be equated to yield:
µ+ θet = θ[τ + et]⇔ µ− θτ = etθ[− 1]
et =
µ− θτ
θ(− 1) =
θτ − µ
θ(1− )
Hence, we have:
et =
0, if θ ≤
µ
τ ;
τθ− µ
θ(1− ) , otherwise.
(A.5)
Next, we know that the budget constraint is given by:
wtht(1− τnt) = c1,t + st + et(wtht)nt.
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From eq. (A.3), etnt(wtht) can be expressed as:
etnt(wtht) =
β2
ψ
− τntwtht. (A.6)
Substituting from eqs. (A.1), (A.2) and (A.6), the budget constraint can be expressed as:
wtht − τntwtht = 1
ψ
+
β1
ψ
+
β2
ψ
− τntwtht
which on simplifying leads to:
ψ =
1 + β1 + β2
wtht
(A.7)
whose substitution into eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) yields:
c1,t =
wtht
1 + β1 + β2
;
st =
β1wtht
1 + β1 + β2
,
Substituting for et from eq. (A.5) and for ψ from eq. (A.7) in eq. (A.3), yields:
nt =

β2θ
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
, if θ ≤ µτ ;
β2θ(1− )
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ) , otherwise.
This completes the solution to the utility maximization exercise of households.
B Derivation of Eq. (31)
The research arbitrage argument goes as follows. Suppose an intermediate firm faces two options.
First, it can make an investment of pAt in physical capital and earn the market rate of interest, rt.
Alternatively, it can purchase a patent, earn profits in one period and, then, sell the patent. In
equilibrium, the rate of return from both these investments should be the same. That is,
rtp
A
t = pit + (p
A
t+1 − pAt ).
The l.h.s of this equation is the interest earned from investing in physical capital. The r.h.s is the
sum of the profits earned and the capital gain/loss resulting from the change in price of patents
over time. Rearranging the above equation yields the following research arbitrage condition:
rt =
pit
pAt
+
[
pAt+1 − pAt
pAt
]
. (B.1)
This equation states that R&D sector charges a price of blueprint, pAt , such that intermediate input
producers are indifferent between purchasing a blueprint to produce an intermediate variety and
not producing the intermediate variety at all. The dividend rate, given by,
pit
pAt
. and the capital
gain/loss,
pAt+1 − pAt
pAt
, equal the market rate of return on investment, rt. We know from Proposition
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3.2 that rt is constant along BGP. This implies l.h.s of eq. (B.1) is constant. For r.h.s to be
constant, following condition should hold true.
pit+1
pit
=
pAt+1
pAt
.
From eq. (18), we have:
pit = α(1− α) Yt
At
.
This implies:
pit+1
pit
=
Yt+1
Yt
At+1
At
(B.2)
Now, it is known from eq. (48) that along BGP,
gY = (1 + gA)(1 + gH)− 1.
Inserting in eq. (B.2), we deduce:
pit+1
pit
=
Ht+1
Ht
= (1 + gH).
Thus, eq. (B.1) holds true if
pit+1
pit
=
pAt+1
pAt
= (1 + gH).
Inserting in eq. (B.1) and solving for pAt , we get
pAt =
pit
rt − gH .
This completes derivation of eq. (31).
C Derivations of Eqs. (58) and (59)
We know that (1 + gH) = (1 + gh).n. Differentiating both the sides w.r.t θ yields:
∂gH
∂θ
= (1 + gh)
∂n
∂θ
+ n
∂gh
∂θ
. (C.1)
When θ >
µ
τ , we know from Lemma 1 that:
∂nt
∂θ
= − µβ2(1− )
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ)2 ,
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and it is given (1 + gh) =
[
(τθ − µ)
(1− )
]
from eq (9). Differentiating gh w.r.t θ, we get that:
∂gh
∂θ
=
[
(τθ − )
1− 
]
.
τ
τθ − µ =
(1 + gh)τ
τθ − µ . (C.2)
Substituting this into eq. (C.1), we get that:
∂gH
∂θ
= (1 + gH)
−µβ2(1− )
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ)2 + (1 + gh)
τ
τθ − µ ∗ n,
Substituting for n from eq. (8),
= (1 + gh)
[
τβ2θ(1− )
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ)2 −
µβ2(1− )
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ)2
]
= (1 + gh)[τθ − µ] β2(1− )
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ)2 .
Alternatively, when θ ≤ µτ , we know from Lemma 1 that:
∂nt
∂θ
=
β2
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
,
and it is given (1 + gh) = µ
 from eq. (9). Differentiating gh w.r.t θ yields:
∂gh
∂θ
= 0. (C.3)
Substituting this into eq. (C.1), we get that:
∂gH
∂θ
= (1 + gH)
β2
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
=
β2
(1 + β1 + β2)µ1−
This completes derivation of eqs. (58) and (59).
D Derivations of Eqs. (62), (64), (66) and (67)
The growth rate of per capita income can be expressed as:
(1 + gy) =
(1 + gY )
n
. (D.1)
Under innovation regime, substituting for (1 + gY ) from eq. (49) and simplifying, we get:
(1 + gy) = (1 + gh)
1−φ+λ
1−φ n
λ
1−φ . (D.2)
Taking log on both sides,
log(1 + gy) =
1− φ+ λ
1− φ log(1 + gh) +
λ
1− φlogn.
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Differentiating w.r.t θ, yields
1
1 + gy
∂gy
∂θ
=
1− φ+ λ
(1 + gh)1− φ
∂gh
∂θ
+
λ
1− φ(n)
∂n
∂θ
, (D.3)
When θ >
µ
τ , substituting for n from eq. (8),
∂n
∂θ
from Lemma 1 and
∂gh
∂θ
from eq. (C.2) yields:
∂gy
∂θ
=
1 + gy
1− φ
[
(1− φ+ λ)τ
τθ − µ −
µλ
θ(τθ − µ)
]
.
Next, we consider the case when θ ≤ µτ .
Substituting for n from eq. (8),
∂gh
∂θ
from eq.(C.3) and
∂n
∂θ
from Lemma 1 in eq. (D4), we deduce:
∂gy
∂θ
=
[
λ(1 + gy)
θ(1− φ)
]
.
We now, consider the imitation regime.
Substituting for (1 + gY ) from eq. (50) and simplifying, we get:
(1 + gy) = (1 + gA¯)
1
2−φ (1 + gh)
2−φ+λ
2−φ n
λ
2−φ . (D.4)
Taking log on both sides,
log(1 + gy) =
1
(2− φ) log(1 + gA¯) +
2− φ+ λ
(2− φ) log(1 + gh) +
λ
2− φlogn; (D.5)
Differentiating w.r.t θ, we get:
1
1 + gy
∂gy
∂θ
=
2− φ+ λ
2− φ(1 + gh)
∂gh
∂θ
+
λ
2− φ(n)
∂n
∂θ
. (D.6)
When θ >
µ
τ , substituting for n from eq. (8),
∂n
∂θ
from Lemma 1 and
∂gh
∂θ
from eq. (C.2), we have:
∂gy
∂θ
=
1 + gy
2− φ
[
(2− φ+ λ)τ
τθ − µ −
µλ
θ(τθ − µ)
]
.
We next, consider the case when θ ≤ µτ .
When θ ≤ µτ , substituting for n from eq. (8),
∂gh
∂θ
from eq.(C.3) and
∂n
∂θ
from Lemma 1 in eq.
(D.6) yields:
∂gy
∂θ
=
[
λ(1 + gy)
θ(2− φ)
]
.
This completes derivations of eqs. (62), (64), (66) and (67).
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E Derivations of Eqs. (68) and (69)
We derive the conditions when an economy with high quality of schooling
(
θ >
µ
τ
)
exhibits a
higher per capita output growth rate as compared to an economy with lower quality of schooling(
θ ≤ µ
τ
)
. We assume that when θ >
µ
τ
, quality of schooling is denoted by θh for that particular
economy whereas quality of schooling is denoted by θl for an economy with quality of schooling less
than the threshold
(
θ ≤ µ
τ
)
. An economy with higher schooling quality (θh) will grow at a higher
rate as compared to an economy with lower quality of schooling (θl) when the following condition
holds true under both the technology regimes:
gy,θh > gy,θl (E.1)
We first, derive the condition for innovation economy. Substituting from eq. (60), we have
(1 + gh,θh)
1−φ+λ
1−φ (nθh)
λ
1−φ > (1 + gh,θl)
1−φ+λ
1−φ (nθl)
λ
1−φ , (E.2)
where gh,θh and gh,θl are per capita human capital accumulation rates when θ >
µ
τ
and θ ≤
µ
τ
respectively and nθh and nθl are the fertility rates when θ >
µ
τ
and θ ≤ µ
τ
respectively.
Substituting from eqs. (9) and (8) for (1 + gh,θh), (1 + gh,θl), nθh and nθl to get:[
(τθh − µ)
1− 
](1−φ+λ [ θh(1− )
(τθh − µ)
]λ
> µ(1−φ+λ
[
θl
µ
]λ
which on simplification, yields:
θλh >
[
µ(1− )
(τθh − µ)
](1−φ+λ [θl(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]λ
,
This can be further simplified to:
θh > θl
[
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]λ− (1− φ+ λ)
λ .
Similarly, we derive the condition for imitation economy. Substituting from eq. (61), we get
(1 + gA¯)
1
2−φ (1 + gh,θh)
2−φ+λ
2−φ (nθh)
λ
2−φ > (1 + gA¯)
1
2−φ (1 + gh,θl)
2−φ+λ
1−φ (nθl)
λ
2−φ .
Substituting from eqs. (9) and (8) for (1 + gh,θh), (1 + gh,θl), nθh and nθl , we derive:[
(τθh − µ)
1− 
](2−φ+λ [ θh(1− )
(τθh − µ)
]λ
> µ(2−φ+λ
[
θl
µ
]λ
,
which simplifies to:
θλh >
[
µ(1− )
(τθh − µ)
](2−φ+λ [θl(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]λ
,
This can be re-expressed as:
θh > θl
[
(τθh − µ)
µ(1− )
]λ− (2− φ+ λ)
λ .
This completes derivations of eqs. (68) and (69).
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F Derivations of Eqs. (72) and (73)
We know that:
(1 + gH) = (1 + gh).n
Differentiating both the sides w.r.t , we get that:
∂gH
∂
= (1 + gh)
∂n
∂
+ n
∂gh
.
∂ (F.1)
When θ >
µ
τ , we know from the interior solution of eq. (9) that:
1 + gh =
[
(τθ − µ)
(1− )
]
.
Taking log on both sides,
log(1 + gh) = log+ log(τθ − µ)− log(1− ),
Differentiating w.r.t , we get the following expression:
1
1 + gh
∂gh
∂
= 1 + log+ log(τθ − µ) + 
1−  − log(1− ),
which on simplification reduces to:
∂gh
∂
= (1 + gh)
[
log
1
(1− ) +
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
. (F.2)
Also, from Lemma 2, we have ∂nt
∂
=
−β2θ
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ) . Substituting for
∂n
∂
from Lemma 2
and
∂gh
∂
from eq. (F.2) into eq. (F.1), we derive that:
∂gH
∂
=
−β2θ(1 + gh)
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ) + (1 + gh)n
[
1
(1− ) + log
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
Substituting for
β2θ
(1 + β1 + β2)(τθ − µ) from eq. (8), yields:
= (1 + gh)
[
n
[
1
(1− ) + log
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
− n
1− 
]
(F.3)
= (1 + gH)log
[
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
.
We next derive the expression for
∂gH
∂
when θ ≤ µτ .
When θ ≤ µτ , it is known from eq. (9) that:
(1 + gh) = µ
.
Taking log on both sides,
log(1 + gh) = logµ,
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Differentiating gh w.r.t  yields:
∂gh
∂
= (1 + gh)logµ. (F.4)
Further, we derive know from Lemma 2 that
∂nt
∂
=
β2θ
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
. Substituting for
∂n
∂
and ∂gh∂
from eq. (F.4) into eq. (F.1), we deduce that:
∂gH
∂
=
β2θ(1 + gh)
(1 + β1 + β2)µ
+ (1 + gh)nlogµ.
Substituting for
β2θ
(1 + β1 + β2)µ)
from eq. (8) when θ ≤ µτ , we derive that:
= (1 + gH)
[
1

+ logµ
]
. (F.5)
This completes the derivations of eqs. (72) and (73).
G Derivations of Eqs. (74), (77), (80) and (81)
It is known from eq. (D.2) that the growth rate of per capita income under innovation regime is
given by:
(1 + gy) = (1 + gh)
1−φ+λ
1−φ n
λ
1−φ . (G.1)
Taking log on both sides,
log(1 + gy) =
1− φ+ λ
1− φ log(1 + gh) +
λ
1− φlogn.
Differentiating w.r.t  yields:
1
1 + gy
∂gy
∂
=
1− φ+ λ
(1 + gh)1− φ
∂gh
∂
+
λ
1− φ(n)
∂n
∂
. (G.2)
When θ >
µ
τ , substituting for n from eq. (8),
∂n
∂
from Lemma 2 and
1
1 + gh
∂gh
∂
from eq. (F.2),
we get:
∂gy
∂
=
(1− φ+ λ)(1 + gy)
1− φ
[
1
1−  + log
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
− (1 + gy)λ
(1− )(1− φ) . (G.3)
We next, consider the case where θ ≤ µτ .
Substituting for n from eq. (8),
∂gh
∂
from eq. (F.4) and
∂n
∂
from Lemma 2 in eq. (G.3) yields:
∂gy
∂
= (1 + gy)logµ
[
1 +
λ
1− φ
]
+
λ(1 + gy)
(1− φ) .
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We next, derive the expression for
∂gy
∂
under imitation regime.
We know from eq. (D.5) that:
log(1 + gy) =
1
(2− φ) log(1 + gA¯) +
2− φ+ λ
(2− φ) log(1 + gh) +
λ
2− φlogn,
Differentiating w.r.t , we get:
1
1 + gy
∂gy
∂
=
2− φ+ λ
2− φ(1 + gh)
∂gh
∂
+
λ
2− φ(n)
∂n
∂
. (G.4)
When θ >
µ
τ , substituting for n from eq. (8),
∂n
∂
from Lemma 2 and
∂gh
∂
from eq. (F.2) yields:
∂gy
∂
=
(2− φ+ λ)(1 + gy)
2− φ
[
1
1−  + log
(τθ − µ)
1− 
]
− (1 + gy)λ
(1− )(2− φ) .
Alternatively, when θ ≤ µτ , substituting for n from eq. (8),
∂gh
∂
from eq. (F.4) and
∂n
∂
from
Lemma 2 in eq. (G.4) yields:
∂gy
∂
= (1 + gy)logµ
[
1 +
λ
2− φ
]
+
λ(1 + gy)
(2− φ) .
This completes derivations of eqs. (74), (77), (80) and (81).
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